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Abstract
Despite major developments in gender equality, di↵erences between men and women’s eco-
nomic and social behaviors remain. Several studies demonstrate the importance of gender
norms in explaining a significant part of the gender gap. But what shapes gender norms?
I provide evidence on the role of education, considered to be a key factor to reach gender
equality, in influencing attitudes on gender norms in two di↵erent domains: the labor market
and household. Exploiting educational reforms in Europe, I find that mandatory education
and years of education significantly reduces individuals’ level of agreement on the gender
norm that the man should be the breadwinner but not on the gender norm that the woman
should be the homemaker. The result is consistent with the hypothesis that part of the
”stalled revolution” in gender equality is because norms in the household are more rigid
than in the labor market, and that educated women face a dilemma between a career and
family, or a double burden where they continue to do the lion’s share of household work.
Keywords: Gender equality; Education; Gender Norms; Labor market; Household Eco-
nomics
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1 Introduction
Women have experienced several advancements in gender equality over the last decades,
in particular in the labor market. Some of the explanations for this are access to birth
control, the introduction of anti-discrimination laws, and changes in abortion and divorce
laws (Goldin, 2006; Goldin, 2014). Despite the converging roles of women and men, however,
gender gaps in the labor market and household remain substantial. Di↵erences in wages,
hours of work, and field of occupation persist in all OECD countries and cannot be completely
explained by di↵erences in schooling, experience, and job characteristics (Barigozzi et al.,
2017; Blau and Kahn, 2006; Fortin, 2005; O’Neill, 2003).
A recent strand of literature focuses on the role of gender norms in creating and main-
taining gender gaps. Norms refers to how society believes that individuals should behave
(Michaeli and Spiro, 2017). They come with a set of prescribed behaviors that are costly to
violate because they cause discomfort and anxiety in oneself and others, and therefore limit
choices and behaviors (Akerlof and Kranton 2000; 2010). Gender norms can explain gender
di↵erences in household work, paid labor, the choice of fields of education, discrimination,
risk-taking behavior, divorce rates, marriage rates, and fertility rates (Akerlof and Kranton,
2000; Bertrand et al., 2015a; Bittman et al., 2003; Brines, 1994; Evertsson and Nermo,
2004; Greenstein, 2000; Fernandez and Fogli,2009; Fortin, 2005; Hwang, 2016; Maxwell and
Wozny, 2017; Zetterdahl and Hellstro¨m, 2015). The importance of gender norms makes a
focus on the determinants of gender norms a crucial step to strive for gender convergence in
the labor market (Bertrand, 2015b).1
Today, education is considered to be one of the most important tools to reach gender
1. Lippmann et al. (2016) provides a good summary of the explanations for the existence
and persistence of gender norms. Women and men can have di↵erent comparative advantages
that lead to a specialization in the household or labor market (Becker, 1973; 1974), due to
biological di↵erences or because di↵erent stages of a society’s development require di↵erent
types of economic activity (Alesina et al., 2013). Institutions can create incentives for more or
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equality. Gender equality in education is the main target to reach the United Nation’s third
Millennium Development Goal: To promote gender equality and empower women (SADEV,
2011). Given the importance of gender norms in influencing individual’s economic and
social behavior, the degree to which educational policies that increase (mandatory) years of
schooling also will increase gender equality depends on if and how education influence gender
norms in the labor market and household.
In this paper, I present one of the first estimates of the causal e↵ects of education on
attitudes on gender norms in the labor market and household. I exploit educational reforms
that increased mandatory education in 15 European countries between the 1930s and 1980s.
The reforms create an exogenous variation in school-leaving age across countries and birth
cohorts that allows me to estimate causal e↵ects. I use data from the European Social
Survey (ESS), which includes two statements that capture individuals’ attitudes on gender
norms: ”When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women” and ”A
woman should be prepared to cut down on her paid work for the sake of her family.” The
two statements aim to capture attitudes on traditional gender norms where the man is the
breadwinner and the woman is the homemaker.
My analysis proceeds in two steps. First, I estimate the reduced form e↵ect of the reforms
in mandatory education on attitudes on gender norms. This implies comparing attitudes on
gender norms for the cohorts just a↵ected by the reform with those not just a↵ected by the
reform. I find that, on a 5-point scale, individuals exposed to the reform have a significant
0.14 lower level of agreement on gender norms in the labor market but an insignificant
less specialisation and attitudes on gender that persist over time and are transmitted across
generations (Esping-Andersen, 2009; Fernandez, 2011; Fernandez and Fogli, 2019; Lippman
et al., 2016). It can also be due to the gender norms themselves, which continuously influence
women and men’s choices and behaviors (Akerlof and Kranton 2000; 2010).
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0.02 lower level of agreement on gender norms in the household. Second, I estimate the
causal e↵ect of an additional year of education on attitudes on gender norms. Here, I
use birth cohorts’ di↵erent exposure to the reform as an instrumental variable for years of
education.2 The 2SLS estimates show a similar picture to the reduced form estimates. An
additional year of education significantly reduces the level of agreement on traditional gender
norms in labor market by 0.24 points and insignificantly reduces the level of agreement on
traditional gender norms in household by 0.03 points. This suggests that some of the e↵ects of
mandatory education on attitudes on gender norms in the labor market can be explained by
its influence on years of education. My results are robust to alternative model specifications
and robustness checks. A placebo test where hypothetical reforms two years before or after
the actual reforms are introduced also confirms that the e↵ects are not driven by pre-trends
or country-specific structural changes that also influence attitudes on gender identity norms.
Why should education matter for gender norms? Education increases labor market pro-
ductivity, earnings, cognitive and non-cognitive skills, and the acquirement and response to
information (Card, 2001; Meghir et al., forthcoming; Mocan, 2014; Lange, 2011; Oreopolos,
2006; Price and Simon, 2000). It also lowers criminality, increases civic participation, and
lowers religiosity and superstition (Lochner and Moretti, 2004; Milligan et al., 2004; Mocan
and Pogorelova, 2014). There is also some evidence that it matters for health (Chou et al.,
2010; Gathmann et al., 2015; Grossman, 2006). My investigation starts from the premise
2. Angrist and Kruger (1991) is the first to use educational reforms to identify the
causal e↵ect of years of education on earnings in Germany. Since then, several papers use
educational reforms in Europe to study the e↵ects of an increase in years of education,
including Brunello et al. (2009), Brunello et al. (2013), Borgonovi et al. (2010), Clark and
Royer (2013), Fort et al. (2011), Grenet (2013), d’Hombres and Nunziata (2016), Mocan
and Pogorelova (2014), and Pischke and Wachter (2008).
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that education can give individuals a more open-minded attitude on what women and men
are capable of, an increased sense of equality along social identities, and an increased cog-
nitive ability and critical evaluation that leads to the re-evaluation of the cost and benefits
of breaking gender norms. It also increases women’s bargaining power, increases the op-
portunity cost for women staying at home, qualifies them to enter more skilled types of
professions that men traditionally occupy, which can influence attitudes on women’s labor
market participation.
This study adds to a small but growing literature that documents the determinants of
gender norms. Goldin and Katz (2002) find that the pill increased women’s investment’s
in schooling and increased age at first marriage. Goldin (2006) argues that this is because
the pill changed women’s adult identities to be more influenced by career considerations
rather than traditional gender roles. Fortin (2015) argues that the AIDS crisis created a
shock that reversed some of the liberal e↵ect of the pill and resulted to more conservative
gender norms in the 1990s. Lippman et al. (2016) find that gender norms can be altered
through gender-equalizing institutions, using the 41-year division of Germany as a natural
experiment. Taking an intergenerational perspective, Fernandez et al. (2004) find that men
growing up with working mothers are more likely to have working wives. Farre and Vella
(2013) find a link between a woman’s view on the role on role of women in the labor market
and her children’s views towards women in the labor market and their own labor market
participation. Alesina et al. (2013) find that ethnicities and countries where ancestors used
plough cultivation have lower female labor market participation rates even today. Olivetti
et al. (2016) find that a woman’s work behavior is influenced by her mother’s and her
friends’ mothers’ work behavior. Ljunge (2017) study the role of cultural dimensions using
second-generation immigrants and find that pragmatism has a strong influence on gender
norms.
The literature on the role of schooling on attitudes on gender norms is small and in-
conclusive. Friedman et al. (2011) find positive e↵ects of education on domestic violence,
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whereas Gulesci and Meyerson (2012) and Dincer et al. (2014) find no e↵ect on women’s
attitudes on gender equality. This paper is perhaps the most related to Erten and Keskin
(2017), who study the role of education in shaping di↵erent dimensions of domestic violence
in Turkey. They find that education has an e↵ect on the psychological violence and financial
control that women in rural areas experience. The authors study if changing attitudes on
gender norms explains this. Out of seven questions on gender norms, they find an e↵ect in
only two of the seven questions, and conclude that the e↵ect of education is instead driven
by the labor market channel. Key di↵erences between this and earlier studies on education
and gender attitudes is that I use educational reforms in a large number of countries, thus
limiting the worry that the e↵ect of the reform or educational attainment is due to other
contemporaneous changes at that time, or additional changes that the reform caused, such
as a change in the quality of teachers or improved school curricula. I also have questions
specifically designed to capture the gender norms in the labor market and household, which
allows me to study and contrast the e↵ect of education in these domains. Furthermore, as I
have reforms dating back to the 1930s, I am able to use a sample of individuals from a wide
age group and not only short to medium run e↵ects. I am also able to include both women
and men in the analysis and study heterogeneous e↵ects, which several of the earlier studies
do not.
The results in this study highlight that education matters for attitudes on gender norms
regarding women and men’s equal rights to be a breadwinner, but not when it comes to
women’s obligations to prioritize the family over paid work and to be a homemaker. The
findings are in line with the notion that household work is the strongest form of ”doing
gender” and more rigid than other gender norms, and that this is part of the reason for the
”stalled revolution” in gender equality (Hochschild, 1990; West and Zimmermann, 1987). It
supports Goldin’s (1997) findings that women, in particular college-educated women, have
an increased wish to combine a career and family and Bertrand et al.’s (2010) results that
motherhood creates a sharp trade-o↵ between career and family for US female top profes-
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sionals. Similarly, Sasser (2005) finds that time constraints due to family responsibilities
creates an earnings gap due to reduced working hours. Finally, it is also in line with the ar-
gument that the reason why women’s gains in equality has not increased women’s wellbeing
(Stevenson and Wolfers, 2009) is because women now have to succeed as being good moth-
ers, wives, and have careers at the same time (Benabou ad Tirole, 2007). At the aggregate
level, it is in line with Hwang’s (2016) argument that slow changing norms in the household
explains recent demographic changes in countries where there have been vast improvements
of women’s economic success, such as the decline in the marriage and fertility rates among
the educated. From a policy perspective, the results highlights an overlooked limitation of
increasing education, especially when the goal is to increase gender equality, as it does not
appear to address the issue of inequality in the household. It also broadly suggest that
policies that more specifically aim to influence gender norms in the household, such as paid
paternity leave, is needed to increase equality further.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data. Section 3
presents the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents and discusses the results. Section 5
concludes.
2 Data
The empirical analysis uses data from three rounds of the ESS. The ESS data has been
collected biannually since 2000, and each wave contains a nationally representative sample
of 1,500 individuals aged fifteen and above in a large number of European countries.
There are two reasons to use the ESS data. The first reason is that in the waves of
2002, 2008, and 2010, the ESS asked how much the respondent agrees with two statements
related to the respondent’s attitudes on gender norms. The statements are 1) ”When jobs
are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women” and 2) ”A woman should be
prepared to cut down on her paid work for the sake of her family.” Each question allows five
possible answers: Agree strongly, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree, and Disagree
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strongly. Similar to Bertrand et al. (2015a), I interpret a larger degree of agreement on the
first statement as expressing the view that it is more important for men than for women to
be employed in the labor market. That is, that men are supposed to be the breadwinners
in the household.3 I interpret a larger degree of agreement on the second statement as
expressing the view that women have an obligation to prioritize the family over work. That
is, that women are supposed to be the homemakers in the household.4 I recode the answer
alternatives to each statement so that Strongly Agree = 4, Agree = 3, Neither Agree nor
Disagree = 2, Disagree = 1, and Strongly disagree = 0. In other words, a higher value
indicates that the individual’s attitude is in accordance with the gender norms that it is
more important for men to be employed in the labor market relative to women and that
women have an obligation to prioritize family over work.
The second reason to use ESS data is the large sample size. The final sample consists of
individual-level data from 15 European countries that carried out a total of 18 educational
reforms between the 1930s and 1980s. The variation in the number of years of mandatory
education is between +1 and +4 years. The countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ger-
3. Fortin (2005) finds that it is one of the most important explanatory factors when it
comes to cross-di↵erences in female employment rates.
4.One may be concerned that the second variable does not directly capture attitudes
on the traditional gender role of women as homemakers. For example, it is possible that it
captures how much the individual believes that the family should take priority over work for
both women and men (Park et al, 2012). Unfortunately, the ESS does not ask whether men
should be prepared to cut down on paid work for sake of family. Nonetheless, changes in
attitudes when it comes to the latter question does capture the opinion about women’s role
in the household.
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many (West), Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
UK- England, UK- Scotland, UK- Northern Ireland. The reforms were implemented at the
national level, but there was regional variation in the timing in Finland and Germany. Ap-
pendix Table A1 provides a summary of the reforms, and the Technical Appendix describes
the reforms in more detail.5 I exclude non-natives to ensure that individuals went through
the educational system in the country they live in. 6 I also exclude individuals that are
currently in full-time education. To ensure that the estimates are not confounded by other
contemporaneous changes in the country that a↵ected di↵erent birth cohorts’ attitudes on
gender norms, I include individuals born up to four years before and after the pivotal cohort
first a↵ected by the reform. Due to the timing of the reforms, this means that the sample
includes individuals between the ages of 20 and 80. The final sample size is around 10.000
individuals.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Table 1 presents the summary statistics by country and the cohorts a↵ected by the reform
on the two statements on gender norms and the individual controls. The table highlights two
interesting facts about attitudes on gender norms. First, there are stark di↵erences in self-
reported attitudes on gender norms between countries. It is possible that cultural di↵erences
and institutions can explain this. The Nordic countries have less traditional gender norms
and what can be considered more of a dual-earner model. Policies and norms encourage a
more equally shared division of work in the household and labor market. For example, formal
childcare provision is a social right (Plantenga and Remery, 2009), and the compensation for
5. There is one reform per country, except for Portugal where there are four reforms.
6. For both Finland and Germany I use current region of residence as a proxy for region
of residence at the time of the educational reform.
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parental leave is high. Furthermore, fathers in Finland are entitled to more than one month
of paid paternal leave (the same is true for fathers in Germany). These policies may both
reflect gender norms regarding work and family and influence gender norms. Countries such
as Germany, the UK, and Spain have intermediate gender norms. They have unpaid or short
paid parental leave, low provision of paid paternity leave (except Germany), and expensive
childcare provision (UK and Spain). These policies are less egalitarian than the ones in the
Nordic countries (Fahlen, 2016).7 Second, attitudes di↵er on the two gender norms. Overall,
individuals have a lower level of agreement on gender norms in the labor market than gender
norms in the household. The sample average for the former is 1.27, and for the latter it is
2.00. This pattern is found in all countries, albeit to varying degrees. Although these are
di↵erences only in means for the two questions, it supports the notion that the norm of the
man as the breadwinner is less rigid than the notion of the woman as the homemaker, which
is in line with the argument that household work is the main expression of doing gender.
3 Identification strategy
The research design consists of selecting a span of birth cohorts who were the first to
be subject to the post-reform educational system and the last to be subject to the pre-
reform educational system. Thus, each individual is assigned to either the pre-reform group
(non-treated) or the post-reform group (treated).
3.1 Reduced form estimation
I first explore whether there is an e↵ect of reforms in mandatory education on attitudes
on gender norms. In the reduced form model, the relationship between reform status and
7.Note, however, that due to di↵erences in the timing of the reforms, one should not
make any strong conclusions from the comparison of di↵erences in means across countries.
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attitudes on gender norms is the overall e↵ect that includes all mechanisms that connect
mandatory education and attitudes on gender norms. Thus, the reduced form estimates
show if there is any e↵ect of mandatory education on attitudes on gender norms. The model
is:
(1) Attitudesikct =  0 +  1Reformkc +  2Xikct + µc + µt + ✏ikct
Attitudesikct is the self-reported attitude on gender norms of individual i born in year k
and country c, interviewed in survey year t. It lies between 0 and 4, and I use the whole
five-point scale in the analysis.8 A fall in Attitudesikct means that the individual has a less
traditional view of the gender norm of interest. Reformkc takes the value 1 if the individual
born in year k is in in the treated group a↵ected by a reform in mandatory education in
country c and 0 otherwise. The vector Xikct captures individual characteristics and includes
the individual’s age, age squared, gender, whether the individual belongs to a minority group,
whether the individual’s mother is an immigrant, and type of residence dummies. µc and µt
are country-specific and survey-specific dummies, respectively. A crucial assumption of the
identification strategy is that, conditional on the covariates in equation (1), the timing of
the reform is uncorrelated with other changes in the country, for example, cultural, social,
and new policies or institutional changes, that also influence gender norms. To ensure that
the assumption is fulfilled, equation (1) includes country-specific linear and quadratic birth
cohort trends that control for contemporaneous changes in time-varying unobservable factors
at the country level. The trends are measured relative to the pivotal cohort first a↵ected by
the reform and are allowed to di↵er on either side of the reform threshold. The estimated
8. I follow Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) who study subjective well-being data
and show that it makes qualitatively little di↵erence whether one assumes ordinality or
cardinality. In the sensitivity analysis I also use (IV) ordered probit and (IV) probit.
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standard errors are clustered at the country by birth cohort level.9
The coe cient of interest is  1, which identifies the e↵ect of the reforms in mandatory
education among the group of compliers, i.e. those a↵ected by the reform. A non-zero
estimate of  1 would indicate that there is an e↵ect of reforms in mandatory schooling on
the level of agreement on traditional gender norms.
I estimate equation (1) with a sample of treated and non-treated individuals born before
and after the first a↵ected (pivotal) cohort. A larger bandwidth increases sample size and
allows the models to be estimated with power. However, it increases the risk that other
country-specific circumstances a↵ect the birth cohorts in ways that also influence their atti-
tudes on gender norms and bias the estimate. In the main analysis, I use a bandwidth that
includes the four cohorts born before and after the pivotal cohort in order to ensure that the
treated and non-treated individuals are comparable. Since individuals cannot chose their
year of birth, it is unlikely that exposure to the educational reform is correlated with other
unobserved individual characteristics that would also determine attitudes on gender norms.
3.2 2SLS estimation
As discussed, the reduced form e↵ect is the overall e↵ect of all mechanisms that links
reforms in mandatory education with attitudes on gender norms. I next use information
on years of education to study the e↵ect of educational attainment on gender norms. The
methodological challenge when estimating the causal e↵ect of education on attitudes on
gender norms is that education can be related to unobservable individual and family char-
acteristics that are also related to attitudes on gender norms. Also, if attitudes on gender
9. In Portugal’s case, I include reform-specific country dummies, country-reform-specific
birth cohort trends and cluster at the reform and cohort level. In the case of Germany, I
cluster at the region and birth cohort level.
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norms influence society’s capacity to use its pool of talent and grow, then gender norms, the
level of economic development, and educational attainment in the country are endogenous.
As a result, an OLS model that includes years of education as an independent variable may
introduce an omitted variable bias that suggests that more education leads to a change in
attitudes on gender norms when education may not have an actual causal e↵ect per se. Any
conclusions on the role of education in forming gender norms based on the findings in an
OLS model may therefore be incorrect. Thus, it is necessary to use an exogenous change
in education. I therefore next use an IV framework where I instrument years of education
with a dummy that takes the value 1 if the individual is in the treated group and 0 if the
individual is in the control group. The model is:
(2) Attitudesikct =  0 +  1Educationikct +  2Xikct + µc + µt + ✏ikct
(3) Educationikct = ↵0 + ↵1Reformkc + ↵2Xikct + µc + µt + ✏ikct
Here, equation (2) is the second stage, and equation (3) is the first stage. Similar to
the reduced form framework, Attitudesikct is the self-reported attitude on gender norms of
individual i born in year k and country c, interviewed in survey year t. Here, Educationikct is
the endogenous variable educational attainment. It is the number of years of education, and
I instrument it with the exogenous Reformkc variable. As before, the vector Xikct captures
individual characteristics and includes the individual’s age, age squared, gender, whether the
individual belongs to a minority group, whether the individual’s mother is an immigrant,
and type of residence dummies. µc and µt are country-specific and survey-specific dummies,
respectively. I also include country-specific linear and quadratic birth cohort trends. The
standard errors are clustered at the country by birth cohort level. 10
10. I treat the case of Portugal and Germany the same as in the reduced form model.
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An important assumption in the IV framework is that reforms in mandatory education
only a↵ects attitudes on gender norms through the e↵ect on years of education. However,
it is possible that there were other changes in the educational system at the time of the
reform (Garrouste, 2010; Fort, 2006). For example, the reforms in the UK also included
an increase in the number of teachers, school buildings, and infrastructures. In Greece, the
reform also included new textbooks and curricula. In Denmark and Spain, the reforms also
included a new comprehensive school (d’Hombres and Nunziata, 2016). As a result, some of
the reforms also include an overall increase in the quality of education that may influence
attitudes on gender norms. This speaks to the necessity to include linear and non-linear
country-specific trends, as these capture the potential confounding factors. In this case, the
Reformkc variable captures the common change due to all reforms. If all reforms include
the same change in other types of educational inputs, then I estimate the joint e↵ects of an
increase in the years of education and the increase in the quality of education (d’Hombres
and Nunziata, 2016). However, Brunello et al. (2013b) develop and implement a test that
supports the validity of the educational reforms as an IV for educational attainment.11
11. The educational system as an institution may also a↵ect attitudes on gender norms,
for example, through the learning environment and if teachers and the curriculum encourage
gendered behavior, such as leadership and competition. One noteworthy example is former
East Germany, which made several institutional reforms and introduced policies specifically
designed to promote gender equality up until the unification. Examples of this are work-
balance programs, kindergarten and other childcare facilities (Bauernschuster and Rainer,
2012). This changed gender roles in former East Germany and much of this persists today
(Lippmann et al., 2016). At the time of the unification, there was an educational reform
in former East Germany where mandatory education was lowered from 10 to 9 years. It
is possible that this change coincided with other reforms that discouraged gender equality,
as former East Germany adopted former West Germany’s institutions and policies. As a
result, East Germany is excluded from the analysis. While possible, it is unlikely that all the
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4 Results
4.1 Educational reforms and attitudes on gender norms
4.1.1 Reduced form results
Table 2 presents the reduced form estimation results on the e↵ect of mandatory schooling
reforms on attitudes on gender norms. Panel A and B show the results for gender norms
in the labor market and household, respectively. Column (1) shows the results when only
reform status is included as a variable in addition to country and survey year dummies.
Column (2) adds individual controls. Column (3) adds country-specific cohort linear and
quadratic trends. It is the preferred model specification.
Panel A in Table 2 presents the impact of reforms in mandatory education on gender
norms in the labor market. In column (1), which reports the e↵ect of the reforms without
any additional controls besides country dummies and survey year dummies, the reduced form
estimate suggests that the e↵ect of reforms in mandatory education is a significant fall in the
level of agreement on gender norms in the labor market by 0.11 points on a five-point scale.
Column (2) adds individual controls. This slightly decreases the size of the estimate, which
shows that the reforms reduced the level of agreement on traditional gender norms in the
labor market by 0.09 points. In column (3), which adds country-specific linear and quadratic
cohort-specific trends, the e↵ect of the reforms increases. The point estimate shows that the
e↵ect of reforms in mandatory schooling is a fall the level of agreement on gender norms in
the labor market by 0.14 points. The e↵ect is significant at the 1 percent level.
Panel B in Table 2 presents the impact of reforms in mandatory education on gender
norms in the household. In column (1), the reduced form estimate suggests that the e↵ect
educational reforms in Europe that I consider were also purposely re-designed to increase
gender equality.
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of reforms in mandatory education is a significant fall in the level of agreement on gender
norms in the household by 0.07 points on a five-point scale. Column (2) adds individual
controls. Interestingly, the estimate falls in size to 0.04 and is no longer significant. Column
(3) adds country-specific linear and quadratic cohort-specific trends. This further lowers the
size of the e↵ect to a fall in attitudes by 0.02 points. The e↵ect remains insignificant.
Among the unreported estimates, I also find gender di↵erences in attitudes on gender
norms in the labor market but not in the household. Women have a 0.22-point lower level of
agreement with the norm that men are the breadwinners. However, in regard to the norm
that women are the homemakers the di↵erence in the level of agreement between women
and men is an insignificant 0.01 points.12 In other words, women and men tend to disagree
on women’s rights in the labor market but not on women’s obligations in the household.
Overall, the reduced form estimates suggest a significant e↵ect of reforms in mandatory
education on attitudes on gender norms in the labor market and an insignificant e↵ect on
attitudes on gender norms in the household. In other words, the many reforms in mandatory
education in Europe during the 20th century appear to have had an impact on attitudes on
gender norms in the labor market, but not for gender norms in the household. The results
also highlight the importance of including individual characteristics and country- and cohort-
specific trends in the model.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
4.1.2 Placebo test
A concern may be that the reform variable picks up some time trend or structural changes
in each country instead of a true treatment e↵ect of the reform in mandatory education. To
study this, I perform a placebo test in the line of Black et al. (2008) and introduce a
12. Estimates available upon request.
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hypothetical reform in mandatory educational in each country. I construct a new variable
that captures the placebo reform and add it to the main model.13 Table 3 presents the
results from this exercise. Column (1) gives the baseline reduced-form estimates of the
e↵ect of the reform on attitudes on gender norms. Column (2) adds a placebo reform two
years in the past. Column (3) adds a placebo reform two years in the future. Adding
a placebo reform two years before or after does not alter the reduced-form estimates for
the true reform, and the coe cients of the placebo reforms are not statistically significant.
The results from the placebo reform exercise suggest that the true years of the reforms are
meaningful determinants of gender norms in the labor market but not the household, and
that pre-trends or country-specific structural changes are not driving the results.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
4.2 Years of education and attitudes on gender norms
The reduced form e↵ect captures the sum of all e↵ects of the reform in mandatory
education on gender norms. In this section, I study a potential mechanism by analyzing the
e↵ect of years of education on gender norms. Here, I use reform exposure as an instrument
for years of education in an instrumental variable framework.
4.2.1 First-stage estimates
It is crucial for the IV framework that the national reforms create an exogenous increase
in educational attainment for the cohorts a↵ected by the reform. To evaluate the first-
stage relationship between reform status and years of education, I estimate the OLS model
presented in equation (3). Table 4 presents the results. Panel A shows the results when
13. I have to include the true reforms in the model since the placebo and true reform
overlap for some cohorts.
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looking at the gender norms in the labor market, and Panel B displays the results when
examining gender norms in the household.14 Column (1) shows the results when only reform
status is included as a variable in addition to country and survey year dummies. Column
(2) adds individual controls. Column (3) adds country-specific cohort linear and quadratic
trends.
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
The results reveal that reform status is highly predictive of an individual’s years of
education. The correlation is positive and statistically significant in all models. In the
preferred model specification (column 3), the average increase in educational attainment as
a result of being exposed to a mandatory educational reform is 0.6 years. This is a slightly
larger estimate than, for example, Brunello et al. (2009) and d’Hombres and Nunziata (2016)
who find e↵ects in the size of 0.3-0.4 and 0.35 years, respectively, but I use information from
three ESS waves and they use six ESS waves.15
Figures 1 and 2 present visuals of the positive jump in educational attainment due to
the reform. Figure 1 shows the average educational attainment for cohorts born four years
before and after the pivotal cohort first a↵ected by the reform. Figure 2 shows the estimated
e↵ect of the reform on educational attainment for the same window of cohorts. It is the
average educational attainment, net of covariates. I calculate it using the residuals of years of
schooling before and after the reform after I remove the influence of variables and cohort birth
14. The sample size di↵ers slightly but nearly all individuals answer both questions.
15.When I use all six waves of the ESS, the first-stage results are around 0.4. This is in
line with other studies and I am therefore not concerned that the individuals that answer
the questions on gender norms is a sample unrepresentable of the whole population.
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trends. As expected, both Figure 1 and 2 present the jump in the educational attainment
that is the result of the educational reform.
[FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE]
4.2.2 IV results
Table 5 presents the 2SLS estimates from using exposure to educational reforms as an
instrumental variable for educational attainment. Here, the reforms in mandatory education
create an exogenous increase in educational attainment, which allows for causal interpreta-
tions of the estimates. The table’s organization is similar to that of the reduced form results
presented in Table 2. Table 5 also presents the F-statistic of the instrument. It is above
the recommended threshold of 10 in all model specifications (Staiger and Stock, 1997). I am
therefore not concerned with having a weak instrument.
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Panel A, column (1) reports that an additional year of education reduces the level of
agreement on gender norms in the labor market by 0.14 points on a five-point scale. Column
(2) adds individual controls. This slightly increases the size of the estimate, which shows that
an additional year of education reduces the level of agreement on traditional gender norms
in the labor market by 0.19 points. Column (3) adds country-specific linear and quadratic
cohort-specific trends. This increases the size of the e↵ect further, and the point estimate
shows that an additional year of education reduces the level of agreement on gender norms
in the labor market by 0.24 points. The e↵ect is significant at the 1 percent level.
Panel B, column (1) reports that an additional year of education reduces the level of
agreement on gender norms in the household by 0.09 points on a five-point scale. The e↵ect
is significant at the 1 percent level. Column (2) adds individual controls. The estimate
remains similar in size but is no longer significant. Column (3) adds country-specific linear
and quadratic cohort-specific trends. This lowers the size of the e↵ect to a fall by 0.03 points.
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The e↵ect remains insignificant, which indicates that an additional year of education has an
insignificant e↵ect on the level of agreement on gender norms in the household.
Overall, the 2SLS estimates are in line with the argument that higher education has an
e↵ect on attitudes on gender norms in the labor market but not on gender norms in the
household. The size of the e↵ect of an additional year of education on gender norms in the
labor market is similar to the gender di↵erence in the attitude on the same gender norm.
Again, the results also highlight the importance of controlling for individual characteristics
and country- and cohort-specific trends in the model.16
The di↵erence between the reduced form and 2SLS estimates when it comes to gender
norms in the labor market is fairly large. This is most likely because not everyone in the
a↵ected cohorts are compliers of the reform, i.e. they would have more than the mandated
number of years of education even in the absence of the reform. In this case, the reform has
a lower impact on years of schooling. Indeed, the first-stage results suggests that the reforms
increased years of education by an average of 0.6 years. This is lower than the increase in
years of mandatory education in all reforms, which vary between +1 and +4 years.
4.3 Gender di↵erences
So far I have focused on the average impact of education. Since men and women may
have had di↵erent possibilities to continue their education during the time of the reforms
included in the analysis, it is possible that the e↵ect on one gender drives the e↵ect of
mandatory education and years of education on gender norms. For example, Gathmann
et al., (2015) find large gender di↵erences in the e↵ect of mandatory education and years
16. I include both linear and quadratic trends in the main specification, but I have per-
formed all analysis with linear or quadratic trends only. The results do not change. Estimates
are avaliable upon request.
19
of education on health. It is also possible that education only matters for one gender’s
attitudes because women and men may be a↵ected di↵erently. To examine whether the
e↵ect di↵ers for women and men, I interact the endogenous variable years of education and
the instrumental variable reform with a gender dummy. Column (2) in Table 6 presents both
the reduced form and 2SLS estimates. Interestingly, I find no gender di↵erence in the e↵ect
of the reforms in mandatory education or years of education on attitudes on gender norms
in the labor market and household.
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
4.3.1 The importance of exogenous variation
Simple correlations between years of education and attitudes on gender norms may pro-
duce biased results. A simple way to assess this is to compare the 2SLS estimates with the
naive OLS estimates. In the OLS model, I ignore the potential endogeneity of education
and enter years of education as a regressor in the model. Table 7 shows the OLS estimates.
The organization of the table is the same as before. Panel A displays the results for gender
norms in the labor market and Panel B shows the results for gender norms in the household.
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
The OLS results for the relationship between years of education and attitudes on gender
norms in the labor market show a significant negative relationship. The coe cient estimate
is around -0.06 and significant at the 1 percent level in all model specifications. The OLS
results for the relationship between years of education and gender norms in the household
(Panel B) also show a significant negative and significant relationship, but the size of the
estimate is half the size at -0.03.
In all model specifications, the OLS estimates are di↵erent than the 2SLS estimates.
In the preferred model specification, the OLS estimate suggests that an additional year of
education reduces the level of agreement on gender norms in the labor market by 0.06 points
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on a five-point scale. In contrast, the 2SLS estimate shows a much larger e↵ect of 0.24
points. This is a stark di↵erence, which suggests that the OLS estimates are biased against
finding a role of years of education for attitudes on gender norms in the labor market and
highlights the need for exogenous variation in education to identify causal e↵ects. On the
other hand, the di↵erence between the OLS and the 2SLS estimates on the e↵ect of education
on attitudes on gender norms in the household is not as much about size, but significance
of the estimates. Here, the results suggest that OLS estimates are biased toward finding a
significant role of education on attitudes on gender norms in the household and highlights
the need for exogenous variation in education to identify insignificant causal e↵ects.
The 2SLS estimate is identified using the compliers for the reform, i.e., those whose
final education increases due to the reform. Earlier studies using school reforms as an
instrument for educational attainment typically find larger treatment e↵ects than those from
OLS (Oreopoulos, 2006). Card (2001) and Lang (1993) suggest that this is because the 2SLS
estimate is identified using the compliers of the reform, whereas the OLS estimate captures
the average e↵ect for the whole population, given that there are no omitted variables and
measurement bias. Since the reforms I consider concern changes in mandatory education for
grades 4-9, it is likely that the compliers are individuals who would have had low educational
attainment before the reform, perhaps due to credit constraints or more need for immediate
work. It is also possible that the reform a↵ects these individuals di↵erently in terms of
attitudes on gender norms. As a result, a possible explanation why the 2SLS estimates are
di↵erent from the OLS estimates is that the local average treatment e↵ect (LATE) that I
identify is di↵erent than the average treatment e↵ect (ATE) on the whole population. This
implies that the results are not generalizable to the whole population. On the other hand,
Oreopoulos (2006) compares school reforms of di↵erent scopes and finds that the ATE and
the LATE only di↵er a small amount, and that the main reason why the OLS estimates are
smaller than the 2SLS estimates is not due to di↵erences in the population of the individuals
a↵ected by the instrument.
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4.4 Robustness checks
I estimate di↵erent versions of the main reduced form and IV model to test the robustness
of my results. As mentioned in the identification strategy, the choice of bandwidth of the
pre- and post-reform cohorts introduces a trade-o↵ between e ciency and bias. To study
the results’ sensitivity to the choice of bandwidth, I decrease and increase the bandwidth
of the control and treatment groups to include individuals born 3 and 5 years before and
after the pivotal cohort. Table 8, columns (1) to (2) present the results for both the reduced
form and 2SLS estimates. The e↵ects of the reforms in mandatory education and years of
education are always significant for gender norms in the labor market and insignificant for
gender norms in the household. The F-statistic of the instrument falls below 10 when the
bandwidth is 3 years. This is most likely due to the reduction in the sample size.
Next, I add variables that are arguably a↵ected by education and related to attitudes
on gender norms: marriage status, number of household members, having children at home,
labor market status, and being very religious. Table 8, column (3) presents the results. The
estimates of the e↵ect of reforms in mandatory education and years of education on gender
norms in the labor market remain similar in size and significant. The estimates of the e↵ect
of reforms in mandatory education and years of education on gender norms in the household
falls slightly and remains insignificant. Column (4) presents the results when I include the
sample weights provided in the ESS data. The size of the estimates of the role of reforms
in mandatory education and years of education on gender norms in the labor market falls
slightly but remain significant. The e↵ects of mandatory education and years of education
on gender norms in the household remain insignificant. Column (5) presents the results
when I exclude the pivotal cohort first a↵ected by the reform. Since the implementation
of the reform may have taken some time there may be a mix of treated and non-treated
individuals in the pivotal cohort for each reform. Since this excludes a large proportion
of individuals that arguably were the most a↵ected by the reform and reduces the overall
sample size, the F-statistic of the instrument falls to below 10. However, the interpretation
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of the results remain the same. Column (6) presents the results when I use an ordered probit
or IV ordered probit model to relax the assumption that the distance between the answer
alternatives are all equal. This allows me to test whether the assumption in the main model
that the outcome variables are continuous matters for the estimated e↵ect. Column (7)
presents the results from when I construct binary outcome variables that take the value 1 if
the individual answers that they Strongly Agree, Agree, or Neither agree nor disagree with
the statement, and 0 otherwise (Disagree or Strongly Disagree). The interpretation of the
results do not change when I use an (IV) ordered probit or (IV) probit model.17
[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]
5 Conclusion
Education is considered a key tool to reach gender equality and a growing literature finds
that gender norms can explain some of the gender di↵erences in women and men’s economic
and social behaviors.
In this paper, I present one of the first estimates of the importance of education in
shaping attitudes on gender norms. In particular, this is the first paper to study the separate
role of education on gender norms in the two spheres of the labor market and household.
My empirical analysis uses birth cohorts’ exposure to educational reforms in 15 European
countries between the 1930s and 1980s to estimate the reduced form e↵ect of mandatory
education on attitudes on gender norms. I then exploit the variation in exposure to the
educational reform to identify the e↵ect of years of education on attitudes on gender norms
in an IV framework. I find evidence that an increase in mandatory education and years
of education lowers the level of agreement on traditional gender norms in the labor market
17. The IV ordered probit model is estimated with the Conditional Mixed Process (CMP)
command in STATA, developed by Roodman (2011).
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but not for gender norms in the household. These results are robust to several model
specifications, robustness checks, and a placebo test.
The results add knowledge on several important aspects regarding education and gender
equality. First, the many educational reforms in Europe during the 20th century that in-
creased mandatory education have had a long-lasting impact on today’s attitudes on gender
norms in the labor market but not in the household. From a policy perspective, this result
highlights a benefit and, interestingly, an important and overlooked limitation of policies that
aim to increase education. Without complementary policies that change gender norms in the
household, the ”stalled revolution” on female empowerment and gender equality may remain.
Second, I demonstrate a causal e↵ect of years of education on attitudes on gender norms
in the labor market but not the household. This creates a dilemma for educated women
who aspire for a career but also feel the obligation to be the homemaker in the household.
Together, the results provide supporting evidence for the hypothesis that reason for the re-
maining gender gap in countries where there has been large improvements in gender equality
is, at least partly, due to the fact that gender norms in the household are less malleable
than norms in the labor market. This may, in turn, lead to demographic changes in terms
of falling marriage and fertility rates and increasing divorce rates, as recently experienced in
several countries worldwide.
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7 Figures and Tables
Figure 1. Reform exposure and years of education for the 4+/-4 window
Figure 2. E↵ect of the reform, net of covariates
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TABLE 2:
Reduced form results
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: ”When jobs are scarce, men should
have more right to a job than women.”
Reform -0.105*** -0.091*** -0.142***
(0.0222) (0.0353) (0.0465)
Observations 10,090 9,961 9,961
Panel B: ”A woman should be prepared to cut
down on her paid work for the sake of her family.”
Reform -0.0663*** -0.0382 -0.0196
(0.0216) (0.0341) (0.0449)
Observations 10,082 9,954 9,954
Country Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls No Yes Yes
Trends No No Yes
Notes: This table presents the e↵ect of being exposed to an educational reform on at-
titudes on gender norms in the labor market and household. The outcome variables are
the levels of agreement with the two statements. They range between 0 and 4. Reform
is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the individual’s cohort was exposed to the
reform and 0 otherwise. Country is country-specific dummies. Year is survey-specific
dummies. Individual controls are age, age squared, gender, belonging to a minority group
in the country, if the mother is an immigrant, and area of residence dummies. Trends
are country-specific linear and quadratic birth cohort trends. Robust standard errors are
in parenthesis, clustered at the country-by-birth cohort level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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TABLE 3:
Placebo test: Introducing hypothetical reforms around the actual
reform
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline -2 years +2 years
results
Panel A: ”When jobs are scarce, men should
have more right to a job than women.”
Reform -0.142*** -0.146*** -0.102***
(0.0465) (0.0468) (0.0266)
Placebo reform -0.0385 -0.0406
(0.0341) (0.0750)
Observations 9,961 9,961 9,961
Panel B: ”A woman should be prepared to cut
down on her paid work for the sake of her family.”
Reform -0.0196 -0.0157 -0.0431
(0.0449 (0.0454) (0.0490)
Placebo reform 0.0369 -0.0865
(0.0623) (0.0757)
Observations 9,954 9,954 9,954
Country Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
Trends Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the reduced-form estimates from a placebo test where the
year of the actual reform in each country is moved back two years or forward two years.
The outcome variables are the levels of agreement that the individual reports to the two
statements on traditional gender norms. They lie between 0 and 4. Columns (2) and (3)
provide the first-stage estimates on the e↵ect of reform exposure when the placebo reform is
added to the model. Country is country-specific dummies. Year is survey-specific dummies.
Individual controls are age, age squared, gender, belonging to a minority group in the
country, if the mother is an immigrant, and area of residence dummies. Trends are country-
specific linear and quadratic birth cohort trends. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis,
clustered at the country-by-birth cohort level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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TABLE 4:
First-stage estimates of the effects of the educational reform on
the number of years of education
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: ”When jobs are scarce, men should
have more right to a job than women.”
Reform 0.738*** 0.470*** 0.565***
(0.0793) (0.125) (0.166)
Observations 10090 9961 9961
Panel B: ”A woman should be prepared to cut
down on her paid work for the sake of her family.”
Reform 0.756*** 0.474*** 0.572***
(0.0878) (0.124) (0.166)
Observations 10082 9954 9954
Country Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls No Yes Yes
Trends No No Yes
Notes: This table presents the e↵ects of the reform on the number of years of education
for the main sample. The sample includes individuals born four years before and after
the pivotal cohort. Country are country-specific dummies. Year are survey-specific
dummies. Individual controls are age, age squared, gender, belonging to a minority
group in the country, if the mother is an immigrant, and area of residence dummies.
Trends are country-specific linear and quadratic birth cohort trends. Robust standard
errors are in parenthesis, clustered at the country-by-birth cohort level. *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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TABLE 5:
IV results
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: ”When jobs are scarce, men should
have more right to a job than women.”
Education -0.142*** -0.194** -0.242***
(0.0306) (0.0808) (0.0979)
F-statistic of instrument 86.50 14.17 11.58
Observations 10090 9961 9961
Panel B: ”A woman should be prepared to cut
down on her paid work for the sake of her family.”
Education -0.0898*** -0.0806 -0.0343
(0.0295) (0.0722) (0.0776)
F-statistic of instrument 86.84 14.58 11.98
Observations 10082 9954 9954
Country Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls No Yes Yes
Trends No No Yes
Notes: This table presents the e↵ect of the number of years of education on attitudes on
gender norms in the labor market and household. The outcome variables are the levels of
agreement with the two statements. They range between 0 and 4. Education is years of
education. It is instrumented with national reforms that changed the mandatory number
of years of education. Country is country-specific dummies. Year is survey-specific dum-
mies. Individual controls are age, age squared, gender, belonging to a minority group
in the country, if the mother is an immigrant, and area of residence dummies. Trends
are country-specific linear and quadratic birth cohort trends. Robust standard errors are
in parenthesis, clustered at the country-by-birth cohort level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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TABLE 6:
Differences between women and men
(1) (2)
Baseline results Gender
Panel A: ”When jobs are scarce, men should have
more right to a job than women.”
Reform -0.142*** -0.149***
(0.0465) (0.0520)
Reform⇥Female 0.013
(0.052)
Education -0.242*** -0.336**
(0.0979) (0.144)
Education⇥Female 0.165
(0.113)
Observations 9961 9961
Panel B: ”A woman should be prepared to cut
down on her paid work for the sake of her family.”
Reform -0.0196 -0.0322
(0.0449) (0.051)
Reform⇥Female 0.0230
(0.0505)
Education -0.0343 -0.0595
(0.0776) (0.102)
Education⇥Female 0.0525
(0.0781)
Observations 9954 9954
Country Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes
Trends Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the e↵ect of the number of years of education on self-
reported attitudes toward gender norms in the labor market and household. The
outcome variables are the levels of agreement that the individual reports to the two
statements on traditional gender norms. They lie between 0 and 4. Country is country-
specific dummies. Year is survey-specific dummies. Individual controls are age, age
squared gender, belonging to a minority group in the country, if the mother is an
immigrant, and area of residence dummies. Trends are country-specific linear and
quadratic birth cohort trends. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis, clustered at
the country-by-birth cohort level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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TABLE 7:
OLS estimates of the correlation between education and attitudes on
gender norms
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: ”When jobs are scarce, men should
have more right to a job than women.”
Education -0.0615*** -0.0594*** -0.0595***
(0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0028)
Observations 10,090 9,961 9,961
Panel B: ”A woman should be prepared to cut
down on her paid work for the sake of her family.”
Education -0.0378*** -0.0348*** -0.0346***
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028)
Observations 10,082 9,954 9,954
Country Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls No Yes Yes
Trends No No Yes
Notes: This table presents the correlation between the number of years of education and
attitudes on gender norms in the labor market and household. The outcome variables are the
levels of agreement to the two statements. They range between 0 and 4. Education is years of
education. Country is country-specific dummies. Year is survey-specific dummies. Individual
controls are age, age squared, gender, belonging to a minority group in the country, if the
mother is an immigrant, and area of residence dummies. Trends are country-specific linear
and quadratic birth cohort trends. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis, clustered at
the country-by-birth cohort level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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8 Appendix
TABLE A1:
Summary of reforms
Country Change in number Year of First a↵ected
of years of implementation cohort
mandatory education
Austria 8 to 9 1962 1951
Belgium 8 to 12 1983 1969
Denmark 7 to 9 1971 1957
Finland (Southern) 6 to 9 1976 1965
Finland (Eastern) 6 to 9 1974 1963
Finland (Northern) 6 to 9 1972 1961
France 8 to 10 1967 1953
Germany (Schleswig-Holstein) 8 to 9 1956 1941
Germany (Hamburg) 8 to 9 1949 1934
Germany (Niedersachsen) 8 to 9 1962 1947
Germany (Bremen) 8 to 9 1958 1943
Germany (Nordrhein-Westfalen) 8 to 9 1967 1953
Germany (Hessen) 8 to 9 1967 1953
Germany (Rheinland-Pfalz) 8 to 9 1967 1953
Germany (Baden-Wrttemberg) 8 to 9 1967 1953
Germany (Bayern) 8 to 9 1969 1955
Germany (Saarland) 8 to 9 1964 1949
Greece 6 to 9 1975 1963
Ireland 8 to 9 1972 1958
Italy 5 to 8 1963 1950
The Netherlands 7 to 9 1950 1936
Portugal 3 to 4 1956 (boys) 1945 (boys)
3 to 4 1960 (girls) 1949 (girls)
4 to 6 1964 1956
6 to 9 1986 1981
Spain 6 to 8 1970 1957
UK - England 8 to 9 1972 1958
UK - Northern Ireland 8 to 9 1972 1958
UK - Scotland 8 to 9 1972 1959
Notes: This table describes the change in mandatory education for the reforms included in
the empirical analysis. Please see the Technical Appendix for more information.
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9 Technical Appendix
The following section describes the educational reforms in more detail.
9.1 Austria
The 1962 School Ammendment Act increased the mandatory number of years of educa-
tion from 8 to 9. Starting age remained the same, but leaving age increased from 14 to 15.
The law came into e↵ect in 1966. The first a↵ected cohorts were born in 1951 (Mocan and
Pogorelova, 2014).
9.2 Belgium
The Loi du Juni 1983 reform increased the mandatory number of years of education from
8 to 12. Starting age remained the same, but leaving age increased from 14 to 18. The first
a↵ected cohorts were born in 1969 (d’Hombres and Nunziata, 2016).
9.3 Denmark
The 1971 reform increased mandatory education from 7 to 9 years. Starting age remained
the same, but leaving age increased from 14 to 16. The first a↵ected cohorts were born in
1957 (Fort, 2006).
9.4 Finland
The 1972-1977 reform created regional variation in the implementation of Finland’s ed-
ucational reform, which increased mandatory education from 6 to 9 years. Starting age
remained the same, but leaving age increased from 13 to 16. I consider three regional varia-
tions. Southern Finland implemented the reform in 1976, and the first a↵ected cohorts were
born in 1965. Eastern Finland implemented the reform in 1974, and the first a↵ected cohorts
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were born in 1963. Northern Finland implemented the reform in 1972, and the first a↵ected
cohorts were born in 1961 (d’Hombres and Nunziata, 2016).
9.5 France
The 1959 Berthoin Reform increased mandatory education from 7 to 9 years. It was
implemented in 1967. Starting age remained the same, but leaving age increased from 14 to
16. The first a↵ected cohorts were born in 1953 (d’Hombres and Nunziata, 2016).
9.6 Germany
There were regional variations in the implementation of the educational reform, which
increased mandatory education in former West Germany from 8 to 9 years. Starting age
remained the same, but leaving age increased from 14 to 15. The timing of the reform and
a↵ected cohorts is taken from Pischke and von Wachter (2008).
9.7 Greece
The Greek Parliament increased mandatory education by 3 years in 1975. The first
a↵ected cohorts were born in 1963 (Brunello et al., 2013).
9.8 Ireland
The 1972 educational reform increased mandatory education from 8 to 9 years. The first
a↵ected cohorts were born in 1958 (Fort, 2006).
9.9 Italy
The 1963 reform made junior high school mandatory. Compliance was not instantaneous,
however, and it was not until 1976 that the proportion of children who attended junior high
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school was close to 100 percent. The first a↵ected cohorts were born in 1950 (d’Hombres
and Nunziata, 2016).
9.10 Portugal
Portugal underwent four educational reforms between 1956 and 1986. The first reform
was implemented in 1956 and increased mandatory education from 3 to 4 years for boys born
in 1945 and after. The second reform was implemented in 1960 and increased mandatory
education from 3 to 4 years for girls born in 1949 and after. The third reform was imple-
mented in 1964 and increased mandatory education from 4 to 6 years for individuals born
in 1957 and after. The fourth reform was implemented in 1986 and increased mandatory
education from 6 to 9 years for individuals born in 1981 and after (d’Hombres and Nunziata,
2016). For Portugal, country and reform-specific dummies and country and reform-by-birth
cohort trends are used.
9.11 The Netherlands
The 1950 reform increased mandatory education from 7 to 9 years. The first cohort
a↵ected by the reform were born in 1936 (d’Hombres and Nunziata, 2016).
9.12 Spain
The 1970 General Act on Education and Financing of Educational Reform (LGE) in-
creased mandatory education from 6 to 8 years. The first a↵ected cohorts were born in 1957
(Brunello et al., 2013).
9.13 UK: England, Wales, and Northern Ireland
The 1973 reform increased mandatory education from 9 to 10 years. The first a↵ected
cohorts were born in 1958 (Fort, 2006).
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9.14 UK: Scotland
The 1976 educational reform increased mandatory education from 9 to 10 years. The
first a↵ected cohorts were born in 1959 (d’Hombres and Nunziata, 2016).
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